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TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
F.C. DeCoste*
We love law, not because reason requires it, but because our commitment to our 
discipline serves the needs of the public to whom, and for whom, we are responsible.
Paul Carrington
Woe unto you also, ye lawyers. For ye lade men with burdens grievous to be borne, 
and ye yourselves touch not the buidens with one of your fingers.
Luke 11:46
1. Context
By most accounts, the Anglo-American legal community is in crisis. Our lawyers 
are said to have lost their way, our judges are said not to know their place, our law 
professors (and their unhappy charges) are said to have abandoned the profession, 
and the public, it is said, mistrusts the law more than ever before.1 Whatever else 
may be said about these claims, three things at least appear certain. Firstly, the legal
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community—the bar, the bench, and the legal academy—has lost much of its 
authority. Secondly, lawyers of all sorts and station are experiencing a crisis of faith 
in their way of life which, even where the battle has not been lost, has produced wide 
spread anxiety among them.2 Thirdly, it is now possible to ask, as many have, 
whether lawyers can be saved and the authority of their community somehow 
redeemed.3
Many have offered answers to these questions.4 And very often matters are
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William Simon captures "the experience of ethical disappointment" which infects this "anxious 
profession" in the following passage:
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consistently disappoints the aspirations it encourages.
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thought properly to turn on ’legal ethics.'5 Indeed, for this very reason, in the last 
twenty or so years, 'legal ethics' has established itself as a "growth industry of the 
law," at least in America.6 Yet these initiatives have been a mixed blessing. The 
critical Zeitgeist, which has recorded, if not driven, the turmoil in the profession 
more generally, has sought out legal ethics and responsibility in particular. The 
results have complicated efforts to use legal ethics and responsibility as a site for 
reconstructing professional purpose and authority. Chestnuts like 'officer of the 
court', invoked with happy satisfaction by generations of lawyers, have been 
pronounced conceptually empty and without much fanfare interred.7 Great lawyers 
have been declared not to have been so great after all.8 The codes of conduct, once 
considered the proper sign of professional status, have been ridiculed as aspirational 
and practical failures which, if they speak to anyone at all, speak to the very lowest 
denominator of lawyer.9 The lexicon which lawyers use to describe their moral 
concerns, and the distinction between 'ethics' and 'responsibility' especially, has been 
declared at least confused,10 and the notion of'professional ethics' is now everywhere
5 See for example: Simon, supra note 2; Bickenbach, supra note 3; D. Rhode, In the Interests o f Justice 
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Contemp. Probs. 361; & A.D. Dickerson, "Ethics on the WEB: An Annotated Bibliography of Legal 
Ethics Material on the Internet" (1998) 28 Stetson L. Rev. 369. Neither Canada nor England has 
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of the Legal Profession 139 (arguing that the English "legal profession has not created or maintained a 
discourse about legal ethics"); & A.M. Dodek, "Canadian Legal Ethics: A Subject in Search of 
Scholarship" (2000) 50 U.T.L.J. 115 (commenting on "the dearth of interest in legal ethics in this 
country"). But see with respect to the latter: "Special Issue: The Legal Profession and Ethics" (1995) 33 
Alta. L. Rev. 719; 'Topic: Legal Ethics" (1996) 11:1 Can. J. L. & Jur. 3; & A.A.J. Esau, "Teaching 
Professional Legal Ethics and Responsibility at Law School: What, How, and Why?" in R.J. Matas & 
D.J. McCawley, Legal Education in Canada (Montreal: Federation of Law Societies of Canada, 1987) 
308.
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Vand. L. Rev. 39.
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Boston U. L. Rev. 843.
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confessed to be ambiguous.11
Anxious and perplexing times these, which this brief essay cannot begin to cure. 
My purpose is much more modest. I want to proceed from a simple admission, 
namely, that the criticisms leveled against what we term legal 'ethics' and 
'responsibility' and against the profession more generally are on the whole, if not in 
all of their particulars, telling: legal ethics and responsibility are in a mess, 
practically and theoretically, and the profession is, in all of its parts, in a most 
unhappy state indeed. Needless defence thus put aside, I want then to propose a 
framework of reconstruction for legal ethics. In my view, what troubles legal ethics 
(or if you prefer, legal responsibility) is what troubles our law and profession more 
generally. Too often, first principles are not identified; and almost always, in 
consequence, the derivations and distinctions required for an informed and 
informing view of matters are not drawn. I can here of course only sketch what I 
take to be the requirements of an integrated general view of lawyer ethics and 
morality (we shall turn to this distinction shortly). But if my outline is at all 
persuasive, then this essay will have contributed to the redemption of lawyer 
professionalism. For it turns out that those who think professional salvation lies in 
ethics are right. The authority and ends of the legal community are indeed best 
articulated in answering the two questions with which legal 'ethics' concerns 
itself—whom must lawyers be? and what must lawyers dol
2. Requirements
An adequate view of legal ethics must descend from an acceptable view of the 
distinctly political good which justifies the legal community; it must conceive of 
community membership as public office; it must support a conception offitness for 
office which distinguishes between character and conduct and includes and supports 
prescriptions as regards both matters; and it must apply to the whole o f the legal 
community and not just any one of its parts. Failure to satisfÿ any of these 
requirements results in a view which is without more inadequately grounded and 
incomplete in purview, but worse still, a view which most often distorts the goodness 
of lawyering and misdirects with respect to lawyer practices. Although space 
prevents my offering a full defence and account of these elements, I can explore 
each and sketch the relations between them. I shall start with the last since mistaken 
views of the proper subjects of legal ethics most often lead astray conceptions of 
lawyer obligation.
a. Inclusivity
Academic lawyers are quick to prescribe with respect to both the bench and the bar.
''S ee for example: A. Boon & J. Levin, The Ethics and Conduct o f Lawyers in England and Wales 
i 1999) at 6 ("'Professional ethics' is a phrase with a multitude of possible meanings");
D. Nicolson & J. Webb, Professional Legal Ethics: Critical Interrogations (Oxfoni: Oxford U.P., 1999) 
at 4 (contrasting "legal ethical" and "legal morality"); & S. Parker, "Introduction" in S. Parker & C. 
Sampford, eds., Legal Ethics and Legal Practice: Contemporary Issues (Oxford: Clarendon P., 1995) 
at 1 (on the virtues of not being "prescriptive about the meaning of legal ethics").
Court decisions are routinely scrutinized and criticized, and theories of judicial 
reasoning and obligation are devoutly constructed by those who think scholarly duty 
calls for a grander view of matters. The practising bar, in turn, is analyzed and 
criticized as regards its structure, its membership, and its conduct and, as noted 
previously, exhorting its members to a finer, more ftilsome commitment to law has, 
in the past number of years, become a veritable growth industry in the legal 
academy.12 Academic lawyers, however, seldom connect their musings about the 
bench and bar or subject themselves to the legal criticism they offer so eagerly to 
others or associate their own undertakings with those of the bar and the bench.13 For 
its part, when it is not occasionally (and properly) criticizing the legal academy,14 the 
bar sticks to the business of regulating the conduct of practising lawyers through 
various codes. Seldom does the bar have anything to say about the wider concerns 
of the law or the legal community and never, so far as I am aware, has it evinced any 
understanding of the connections between the legal academy, the bench, and itself. 
The bench appears to think itself both separate and superior to the academy and the 
bar and, in Canada at least, it bristles at any hint of criticism.15
Legal 'ethics' must proceed from the understanding that its object, at the most 
fundamental of levels, is the legal community as a whole. Otherwise, not only will 
many essential matters—and especially, the matter of obligations of bar, bench and
12 The leading efforts are those by Glendon, Kronman, and Linowitz supra note 1.
13 The literature which does exist tends to take the form of fuzzy exhortations which lack the bite and 
measure of mature self-knowledge and criticism. See for instance: J.L. Sammons, "Professing: Some 
Thoughts on Professionalism and Classroom Teaching" (1990) 3 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 609; M.L. 
Swygert, "Striving to Make Great Lawyers—Citizenship and Moral Responsibility: A Jurisprudence of 
Law Teaching" (1989) 30 Boston Coll. L. Rev. 803; & W.E. Oberer, "On Law, Lawyering, and Law 
Professing: The Golden Sand" (1989) 39 J. Legal Education 203. For examples of mature reflection on 
the place and obligations of academic lawyers, see: P. Carrington, "Of Law and the River" (1984) 34 J. 
Legal Education 222 and "Butterfly Effects: The Possibilities of Law Teaching in a Democracy" ( 1992)
41 Duke L. J. 741 ; & D. A. Bamhizer, "Prophets, Priests and Power Blockers: Three fundamental Roles 
of Judges and Legal Scholars in America" (1988) 50 U. Pittsburg L. Rev. 127.
The Association of American Law Schools’ 'Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors in the 
Discharge of Their Ethical and Professional Responsibilities' is perhaps the apotheosis of the legal 
academy's self-serving urge to reduce ethics to inspiration: see, S. Gillers & R.D. Simon, Jr., Regulation 
o f Lawyers: Statutes and Standards, 1994 ed. (Boston: Little Brown, 1994) at 565-571. Even when 
academic lawyers seek to be more precise as regards their professional obligations, typically they 
produce prescriptions, and sometimes even codes, which remarkably fail to account, in any at all 
adequate way, for either the institutional raison d'etre of the professional law school or its place in the 
wider legal community. See for example: W.R. Huhn, "A Proposed Code of Ethics for Law Educators" 
(1988) 6 J. L. & Religion 25; & R.B. McKay, "Ethical Standards for Law Teachers" (1971) 25 Ark. L. 
Rev. 44. Nor is any of this new: see, for example, J.B. Ames, "The Vocation of the Law Professor" in 
J.B. Ames, Lectures on Legal History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P., 1913) 354. Nor is the academic 
branch alone in any of this as the Canadian Judicial Council's anodyne Ethical Principles for Judges 
unhappily proves: see, Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges (Ottawa: Canadian 
Judicial Council, 1998).
14 See for instance: the articles by Kessler and Edwards supra note 1 ; & T.P. Terrell, "A Tour of Whine 
Country: The Challenge of Extending the Tenets of Lawyer Professionalism to Law Professors and Law 
Students" (1994) 34 Washburn L. J. 1.
15 For an account of recent expressions of this attitude, see: F.C. DeCoste, "Introduction" to "Special 
Issue on Judicial Appointments" (2000) 38 Alta. L. Rev. 607-15.
academy to one another—remain illusive, but also the need for a grounding 
justification for a distinctively legal ethic will either be overlooked or else 
impossible to satisfy. The legal community, of course, consists of a judicial branch 
devoted to adjudication, a practising branch devoted to client advice and advocacy, 
and an academic branch devoted to professional preparation and criticism.16
b. Justifying Good
Practising lawyers take it somehow for granted that they belong to a self-governing 
profession; and judges take it for granted that they are somehow properly 
independent from other parts of the state which appoints and pays them. For their 
part, academic lawyers have, especially in recent years,17 become totally confused 
about their proper place: do they owe their authority (and independence) to their 
position in the university or to their membership in the community of lawyers?18 
Both judicial and lawyer complacence and academic confusion point to the matter 
which concerns us.
Professionals are those who profess "fidelity to a particular good."19 This good 
justifies and grounds a profession's institutional existence; and the "solemn 
covenants" which professionals have necessarily to undertake regarding their good 
are the source, first, of those ethical commitments which define the professional's 
very intimate convictions and, only then and derivately, of the complex of moral 
responsibilities and obligations which constitute the professional's role.20
It is the good of law which grounds the existence of the legal community as a 
whole and each of its branches and which is the source of those standards of 
character and conduct to which we will come. Now, though I cannot here offer a
161 take the felicitous term 'branch' from Dean Wright. See: C.A. Wright, "Law and the Law Schools" 
(1938) 16 Can. Bar Rev. 579 ("the teaching branch of the legal profession"). I will resist the temptation 
of speculating on how Dean Wright's sure appreciation of the proper place of the professional law school 
could have become so lost in the intervening years. Nor incidentally is the term 'academic lawyer' mine: 
see, for example, W.L. Twining, "Goodbye to Lewis Eliot: The Academic Lawyer as Scholar" (1980)
15 J. Society Public Law Teachers 396.
17 Wright, ibid. But see: J.S. Auerbach, "Enmity and Amity: Law Teachers and Practitioners, 1900-1922" 
in D. Fleming & B. Bailyn, eds., Law in American History (Boston: Little Brown, 1971) 551.
18 About which see: C.W. Brooks & M. Lobban, "Apprenticeship or Academy? The Idea of a Law 
University, 1830-1860" in J.A. Bush & A. Wiifels, eds., Learning the Law: Teaching and the 
Transmission o f Law in England, 1150-1900 (London: Hambledon P., 1999) 353; P. Carrington, "The 
Revolutionary Idea of University Legal Education" (1990) 31 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 527; & P. Leighton, 
et al, Today's Law Teachers: Lawyers or Academics? (London: Cavendish, 1995).
19D.Koehn, The Ground o f Professional Ethics (London: Routledge, 1994)at 178. For just this reason, 
Deborah Rhode properly insists on reminding lawyers that "the term 'profession' has its origins in the 
Latin root 'to profess' and in the European tradition of requiring members to declare their commitment 
to shared ideals": see, supra note 9 at 325. See also: A.H. Goldman, The Moral Foundations o f 
Professional Ethics (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1980); S.F. Barker, "What is a Profession?" 
(1992) 1(1/2) Professional Ethics 73; and R. Pound, The Lawyer from Antiquity tc Modem Times (St. 
Paul, MN: West, 1953) at 4-10.
20 Koehn, ibid. at 174.
full defence,21 I want to propose that the justifying good of the legal 
community—bar, bench, and academy alike—is the Rule of Law. It is the Rule of 
Law which authorizes the existence and practices of the legal community, which 
calls on our commitments, and which structures and defines our obligations. This 
may be illustrated as follows:
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- to other law yers
Nor can I here do anything more than summarily define the Rule of Law.22 The 
Rule of Law is the core of the political morality of political communities, such as 
ours, which are devoted to, and founded upon, treating their members with equal 
care and respect just because they are considered by such communities to be morally 
equal. That political morality consists of the institutional practice o f constraining 
power of, and through, the state.
The Rule of Law alone explains both the institutional origin and independence 
of the legal community and the nature of its discourse because both are requirements 
of the Rule of Law. Perhaps another illustration will help:
211 offer a book-length account in On Coming to Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 2001) (forthcoming).
22 But see ibid. chp. 7.
INSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
or r u l e  or LAW
r
SEPARATION 
OP POWERS OP RIGHTS A Bojy o f Public Rulms to Corutratn 
Public and Privât* Power
_ _____________________ _ _________I____ _
SUBSTANTIVE LAW PROCEDURAL LAW REMEDIAL LAW
‘ ' ------  - 1 rrtm tlunr Prtlfcl 'PaM c Law P rin t. U nr PaM cLaw  PrtnrtiU P rtlfcLaw  P rin t* Law
admfclM nttnlaw comBMtclâlIaw aAnhMnthw Urn *PP«li oonminnity aervioe damage*
criminal a m e tll civil jurisdiction criminal pm H W  eviction
ylmw crimfaMl hvisduction «vMcno» impriaonment fedimetfcna
J jndcmenb u n d m  other equitable remedie»
motion* parole notation
pelitiai» probation «peciflc perfbrmance
pleailltn mmmary penaltiea mch m finea 
trial procedure 
trial procedure ***«*
That is, the character and existence of the legal community in all of its parts and 
the nature of its practices and discourse are each an institutional creation and 
requirement of the Rule of Law: the separation of powers requires a free and 
independent community of lawyers and the regime of rights which it also requires 
authorizes that community to discuss, contest and, finally, to determine the rights of 
which individuals in societies such as ours are seized, rights as against one another 
(private law rights) and against political community itself (public law rights).
This proposal has experiential purchase because it explains the independence 
which lawyers and judges feel is properly theirs and perhaps as well because it both 
justifies the practices of academic lawyers and gives context to the confusion which 
nonetheless infects much of legal education. More crucial for present purposes, 
however, are its implications for professional ethics and responsibility.
c. Public Office
Political moralities concern, and only concern, the institutions of political 
community and the nature of the offices and practices defined by those institutions 
and their limitations. In liberal democratic states, the political morality of the Rule 
of Law creates two institutions for the political life of community, the political and 
the legal. The political institution of the liberal state consists of two offices, the 
legislative (rule-making) and the executive (law execution and enforcement). The 
legal institution resides in three different, though intimately related, offices, the 
judicial, the practising, and the academic.
Now, of course, this view of matters makes eveiything turn on the nature of 
'office.' Justice Robert Jackson of the U.S. Supreme Court once defended his Court's 
authority in the following terms: “[W]e act in these matters not by authority of our
competence but by force of our commissions.”23 In this, he was invoking the 
authority of his office. All true professions, including law, create offices. An office 
is a position of trust and a warrant of authority under constituted authority which has 
as its purpose service to others.24 The meter of office does not reside in, though it 
may involve, knowledge or proficiency or expertise. It resides rather in the office 
holder's fidelity to the trust of which it is composed and to the service which it 
demands. All offices are public in the sense that they are defined by a concern with 
others and not by self interest. But not all offices are public in the sense that they 
concern the affairs of others in political community. The office of lawyer generally, 
and the offices of the judge, practitioner, and academic lawyer particularly, are 
public in that special sense, while the offices of doctors and clerics are not. The 
lawyer, whatever his or her place in the legal community, is society's agent for the 
protection and transmission of the political culture of equality and liberty.
Lawyerly office does, however, share much with other, private offices. That 
offices may not be reduced to some function associated with expertise means that 
holding an office is a privilege, and not a right, which must depend on qualifications 
of some other sort. Justice Cardozo's famous declaration that being a lawyer is “a 
privilege burdened with conditions” makes sense just because this is so. Those 
conditions contemplate a notion o f fitness, that is, the notion that the conferral and 
continuance of an office properly depends upon a supplicant's character and 
conduct. The authority of the legal community is contingent upon its members, 
individually and corporately, displaying the traits of character and forms of conduct 
which the Rule of Law requires of them as holders of public office, as servants to 
others in political community.
d. Fitness
Neither space nor purpose allows me to offer a detailed account of the obligations 
of service of each of the branches of the legal community. I can however provide 
an overview of the moral and ethical demands which attach to, and together 
comprise, the office of lawyer as such.26
What follows proceeds from two premises, namely, that the Rule of Law is the 
animating principle of the lawyer's office, and that the Rule of Law places both 
moral and ethical demands on lawyers. The second premise relies on a distinction 
between ethics and morality about which we must be clear. A great many law 
schools offer courses in legal ethics, and virtually every law society now has a code 
of ethics. But, according to the view taken here, those courses and codes are 
misnamed because their concern most often is morality and not ethics. Ethics has 
to do with character; it asks and attempts to answer a question which each of us at
23 West Virginia State Board o f Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 at 640 (1943).
24 See: M. Walzer, Spheres o f Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983) chp. 5 ("Office").
25 Matter ofRouss, 221 N.Y. 81 at 84 (1917).
261 offer an account of the obligations of each of the branches in Chapter 9 of On Coming to Law, supra 
note 21.
some point or another asks ourselves, 'What kind of person should I be? Morality, 
on the other hand, has to do with conduct; it asks and attempts to answer a question 
quite different from the first, namely, 'What in any given circumstance (or even 
overall) should I do?'27
Now, offices raise both questions. This should not surprise since offices by their 
very nature concern fitness and fitness requires of office holders, not only that they 
act in certain ways, but also that they exhibit certain inclinations with respect to their 
office. Indeed, it is not too much to say that, as regards offices at least, morality and 
ethics, conduct and character, are interdependent. Offices presume that officers will 
act as their offices require them to act because they are persons of the sort who wish 
to act that way. Take for instance the office of priest or rabbi: priests and rabbis are 
presumed to want to act in priestly and rabbinic ways because, in some important 
sense, they are priests and rabbis. Certainly, no office, including lawyerly office, 
can proceed on the view that character does not count or that absence of moral 
transgression is alone enough. To conceive of matters in either fashion would 
reduce office to empty observance which would sap its animating concern of service 
to others.
27 This distinction cannot be defended here. Any such defence would, however, have to proceed from
a more precise rendering of the distinction along the following lines. Morals are rules or standards for
conduct which, in their widest sense, instruct us by calibrating the proper limits of our autonomy from
others. Ethics, on the other hand, is about the nature and formation of character necessary for the moral
acknowledgment of others. In consequence, while morality is concerned with what we should do, the 
concern of ethics is what, indeed whom, we should be; and while the meter of moral criticism is the 
rightness or wrongness of actions, the meter of ethics is the authenticity or inauthenticity of persons.
In my view, this distinction provides the only source for the clarity and direction for the much needed 
project of reconstructing the theory and practice of professional responsibility in law. And indeed legal 
scholarship which aims to contribute to that project is very often structured in terms of the distinction.
See for example: M.H. Aultman, "Moral Character and Professional Regulation" (1994) 8 Geo. J. Legal 
Ethics 103; R.O. Brooks, "Ethical Legal Identity and Professional Responsibility" (1990) 4 Geo. J. Legal 
Ethics 317; T.D. Eisele, "Must Virtue Be Taught?" (1987) 37 J. Legal Education 495; A. Gutmann, "Can 
Virtue Be Taught To Lawyers?" (1993) 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1759; A.T. Kronman, "Practical Wisdom and 
Professional Character" in J. Coleman & E.F. Paul, eds., Philosophy and Law (Oxford: Basil & 
Blackwell, 1987) 203, "Living in the Law" ( 1987) 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 835, & "The Fault in Legal Ethics" 
(1996) 100 Dick. L. Rev. 489; S.G. Kupfer, "Authentic Legal Practices" (1996) 10 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 
33; C.F. Mooney, "Law: A Vocation to Justice and Love" in F.A. Eigo, ed., The Professions in Ethical 
Context (Philadelphia: Villanova U.P., 1986) 59; R.G. Pearce, "Rediscovering the Republican Origins 
of the Legal Ethics Codes" (1992) 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 241 ; T.L. Shaffer, Faith and the Professions, 
supra note 5 esp. at 113-72; D.L. Rhode, "Moral Character as a Professional Credential" ( 1985) 94 Yale 
L. J. 491; R.L. Simmonds, "Legal Education of Future Professionals in a University" (1991) 9 J. 
Professional Legal Education 37; & R. Wasserstrom, "Legal Education and the Good Lawyer" (1984)
34 J. Legal Education 155.
For philosophical accounts of the distinction, see: M. Cooke, "Authenticity and Autonomy: Taylor, 
Habermas, and the Politics of Recognition" (1997) 25 Political Theory 258; & J. Habermas, "Morality 
and Ethical Life" (1988) 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 38. For discussions of the importance of the distinction in 
other contexts, see: A.J. Dawson, "Professional Codes of Practice and Ethical Conduct" (1994) 11(2) 
J. Applied Philosophy 145; & J. Morse, "The Missing Link between Virtue Theory and Business Ethics" 
(1999) 16(1) J. Applied Ethics 47.
e. Requirements o f Office
To the nuts and bolts then: What character and conduct are required of lawyers by 
virtue alone of their status as lawyers and independently from their location in the 
judicial, academic, or practising branches? In my view, which again I may here only 
sketch, a proper view of professional responsibility would offer a three part reply to 
this question.
i. Threshold: Craft Competence
I have been suggesting that lawyerly office depends upon fitness and that fitness at 
law cannot be reduced to legal expertise or knowledge. But law is very much a craft 
and, if it means anything, being a lawyer means being competent in law's craft.28 
These two understanding are not at odds. Craft competence, rather, is a threshold 
condition: whatever else is required of lawyers morally and ethically, those things 
are required of them because they are lawyers first. Charles Fried once put this 
rather wonderfully: “So what is it that lawyers and judges know that philosophers 
and economists do not? The answer is simple, The Law.”29 Which is to say, a person 
is a lawyer at all because he or she is competent in those things which lawyers do, 
and what lawyers do is practice their craft. In consequence, “no lawyer can fiilfil his 
or her vocation without first achieving a high degree of [craft] competence.”30
ii. Character
The legal community is an interpretive community which, like other communities 
of that kind, is defined by its canon and by the conviction of its members that its 
canon and its interpretive practices are worthwhile. That the legal community is in 
this sense a community of conviction makes of it as well a community o f character.
No less than the interpretive communities devoted to Shakespeare and to the 
bible, lawyers too must believe that their texts and their community's traditions with 
respect to those texts are somehow fundamentally important. All interpretive 
communities, law included, for this reason require of their members an act of faith 
as regards the value of the community's ongoing enterprise. But faith is never blind. 
One commits oneself to an interpretive enterprise because one understands and 
appreciates its point. The point of the legal enterprise is the Rule of Law. Lawyers 
read and interpret and apply legal texts in order to serve the rights of individuals, to
281 offer a full account of lawyer craft in Chapter 4 of On Coming to Law, supra note 21. There I argue 
that, regardless of their place in the legal community, lawyers as such share a distinctly legal craft, which
I term the habits of legality, composed of traditions of argument and interpretation and of sense and 
sensibility. Of course, each of the branches has its own distinct craft traditions, but those more 
specialized crafts depend upon the more basic craft of lawyering as such. That is, the crafts associated 
with client counseling and advocacy, with adjudication, and with legal scholarship and teaching presume 
and require threshold lawyer competence.
29 C. Fried, "The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know" (1981) 60 Tex. L. Rev. 35 at 
57.
30 Mooney, supra note 27 at 83.
save them safe from arbitrary and hurtful power. To commit oneself to law's 
enterprise means therefore committing oneself to the priority o f justice overpower.
That law constrains power through the institutionalized practices of the legal 
community, that those practices oppose and subvert power, means that lawyers, who 
to avoid bad faith must commit themselves to their offices, must be persons of a 
certain sort. Simply, they must be persons for whom the law's pledge of saving lives 
safe from illegitimate power is central to their self-understanding and motivation. 
They must be lawyers to their very roots, lawyers for whom law is a vocation which 
guides and informs the whole of their lives. Lawyers of this authentic kind are 
seized of what has been aptly described a 'protestant' character.31 They are persons, 
that is, for whom the way of power in the world is, without more, a matter of much 
moral moment and of abiding political suspicion. Agnostic of power's right, the 
lawyer is “the man of justice, the man of law, he who opposes to power, despotism, 
the abuses and arrogance of wealth, the universality of justice and the equity of an 
ideal law.”32 The habits o f legality depend finally then upon certain habits o f the 
heart.
It is those habits of character—bom surely of habituated empathy and care for 
others33—which alone permit lawyers to make good their primary obligation of 
serving as the faithfiil and partisan stewards of the Rule of Law. But doing so is yet 
a complicated affair not least because the Rule of Law, and therefore the legal 
community, is at once a creature of, and a containment to, political community. “It 
stands in the dual relationship of suspicion towards and dependency upon [political 
authority].”34
If law is in this sense a habit of the heart, of character and not just of conduct, 
how and when are those habits nurtured? It falls to each of the branches, and to the 
academic branch especially, to nurture lawyerly character. Quite independently 
from those corporate practices, it falls to lawyers individually to attend to their 
ethical growth and maturation. Now, lawyers do this in ways no different from 
clerics. They read office. This lawyers do by reading the law, not just the texts 
which in their tradition carry and express the rules of law, but those other texts 
which articulate the point and requirements of their tradition overall. Included in the 
latter are legal biographies which recount lives well and fully spent at the law. No 
less than do clerics, lawyers require exemplars of living the law. Sometimes, 
happily, exemplars are available in person; but always they are available in legal
31 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P., 1986) at 190,252, & 413.
32 M. Foucault, Power, Truth, Strategy eds. M. Morris & P. Patton (Sydney: Feral Publications, 1979) 
at 43 quoted in C. Douzinas & R. Warrington, Justice Miscarried: Ethics, Aesthetics and the Law 
(Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994)at 15. Foucault's use ofthe masculine arises from historical 
context: he was describing the traits of character of "the great civil lawyers of the eighteenth century" 
who were all men.
33 Judith Shklar puts this well: 'To have no idea of what it means to be treated unjustly is to have no 
moral knowledge, no moral life." See: J. Shklar, "Giving Injustice Its Due" (1989) 98 Yale L. J. 1135.




To be a lawyer is to be subject to one obligation above and before all others: judges 
and academic and practising lawyers are obliged to act as the goodfaith stewards 
o f the Rule o f Law. All other obligations which attach to lawyers in any of these 
practices depend upon, and devolve from, this primary obligation. This holds as 
well, I should stress, for practising lawyers. Yet, it is oftentimes said that the 
fundamental obligation of private lawyers is to their clients. Indeed, no less an 
authority than Lord Brougham declared:
An advocate, by the scared duty which he owes to his client, knows in the discharge 
of that office but one person in the whole world, that client and no other. To save 
that client by all expedient means, to protect that client at all hazards and costs, to 
others, and among others to himself, is the highest and most unquestioned of his 
duties....35
But, though there is much wisdom here, as an overall description of the 
obligations of private lawyers, this will not do. Firstly, it leaves unattended the 
obligations of other lawyers, those judges and academic lawyers, who no less than 
the private practitioner, are members of law's community and officers of its good. 
Secondly, even as regards private lawyers, it leaves groundless the obligation which 
it imposes. Why after all is the lawyer's duty to the client scared and primary? To 
be at all acceptable, views of lawyer morality must identify and defend the grounds 
from which they proceed. And were we here to make the inquiry, we would 
discover that the duty which private lawyers owe their clients is indeed grounded on 
the duty which they owe the public. Thirdly, though it implies further duties, this 
view would face insurmountable difficulties in identifying, categorizing, and 
defending those duties. But enough said about that matter.
That lawyers are obliged first to act as the good faith stewards of the Rule of 
Law is no bromide. Just the contrary, it imposes exact, and exacting, duties. It 
requires first that lawyers understand and commit themselves to the law. One can 
faithfully discharge any office, public or private, only if one adopts an internalpoint 
o f view with respect to it.36 For instance, faithful discharge of a clerical office 
depends upon priests and rabbis viewing their office as something which is good in 
itself and not as something which is an instrument for some good external to the 
office. Were a priest or rabbi to take the latter point of view, say by viewing their 
office as the best career option in terms of work load, compensation, and prestige 
otherwise available to them, then members of their congregations would be right to
3J 2 Trial o f Queen Caroline 8 (J. Nightingale ed., 1821).
36 About which see: R. Barnett, "The Internal and External Analysis of Concepts" (1990) 11 Cardozo 
L. Rev. 525; Bickenbach supra note 3; D.E. Litowitz, "Internal versus External Perspectives on Law" 
(1998) 26 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 127; G.J. Postema, "The Normativity of Law" in R. Gavison, ed., Issues 
in Contemporary Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1987) 81; B.Z. Tamanaha, "The 
Internal/External Distinction and the Notion of a 'Practice' in Legal Theory and Sociolegal Studies" 
(1996) 30 L. & Soc. Rev. 163; & J. Raz, "The Problem About the Nature of Law" in J. Raz, Ethics in 
the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon P., 1994) 179.
charge them with bad faith and inauthenticity. Likewise lawyers: on the pain 
otherwise of bad faith, they too must view their office as a practice which is a good 
and an end in itself.
But there is more here. To profess the law in this way requires lawyers to 
commit themselves to serving others. Karl Llewellyn once described law as "a 
service institution: in service lies its soul -service for client or cause or class, or for 
some dream which embraces all classes and even a world."37 So viewed, the ideal 
of law which lawyers profess requires of them confession to others, to their needs, 
to their rights. Service to others resides at the very heart of the Rule of Law, and this 
service raises another fundamentally important obligation.
The Rule of Law requires that laws be accessible in open, clear, and published 
rules. But "the accessibility of law... must mean more than publication of statutes 
and judicial opinions and their availability in law libraries. 8 It requires as well, 
indeed especially, that lawyers be accessible and available to others. This is the one 
matter of distributive justice which falls properly to the legal community. This is so 
because the Rule of Law commands lawyers—judges and academic and private 
lawyers once again alike—to serve others, fairly and without distinction, and for the 
other's sake.
3. Prognosis
In this brief essay, I have attempted to outline what I consider to be a proper general 
theory of lawyer professional responsibility. I have argued that such a theory must 
arise from and express an acceptable view of political morality; that it must account 
for the whole of the legal community and that the responsibilities which it would 
impose on judges and academic and practising lawyers must devolve from an 
articulated view of the prior and primary obligations which attach to the office of 
lawyer as such; and that it must draw and account for the distinction between 
character and conduct, ethics and morality. I also have claimed that the outline 
proffered here, were it fully fleshed and accomplished, would contribute to the 
political redemption of the law and the moral and ethical redemption of lawyers. By 
way of conclusion, I want to reflect briefly on this claim.
Deborah Rhode argues that “it makes sense to view professionalism not as a 
fixed ideal, but rather as an ongoing struggle.”39 She is very wise in this. 
Professionalism resides not in some declaration of aspiration, and still less in some 
hoped-for epiphany, but rather in the prosaic day-to-day decisions which are the 
stuff and measure of professional life. I referred earlier to Berman's devastating 
diagnosis of the state of our law.40 According to Berman, the crisis of faith in law
37 K.N. Llewellyn, "The Study of Law as a Liberal Art" in K.N. Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in 
Theory and Practice (Chicago: U. Chicago P., 1962) 375 at 391.
38Allen, supra note 34 at 17.
39 D.L. Rhode, "The Professionalism Problem" (1998) 39 Wm. & Maiy L. Rev. 283 at 325.
40 Supra note 4.
is now so deep that recuperation is impossible. And if this is so, candour requires 
of us that we consign our hope to a distant future and that we admit that, for the 
present, ours is indeed a "jurisprudence of despair."41
But Berman is too hasty. There remains in our law, in law offices, in judges 
chambers, and in the law schools, pockets of devotion. Indeed, in recent years, these 
pockets have been growing. More and more lawyers are searching for purpose and, 
in so doing, they have been resurrecting standards of professional conduct and 
practice. A reconstruction of legal tradition of course cannot solve, all at once, every 
stubborn problem which faces the legal community. But reconstruction can 
embolden lawyers to search to reaffirm their faith in the law. Nor can habits of the 
heart alone rekindle the habits of mind and practice on which our law has forever 
depended. Those habits of faith can however “provide a basis for hope th a t... 
lawyers will be moved to encompass reinvigoration of the habits of legality within 
the urgent obligations of professional responsibility.”42
If our legal tradition for these reasons has not reached Berman's dead end, it has 
for those same reasons surely reached a “moment of truth.”43 Lawyers have now 
either to reclaim the goodness of their traditions or to acknowledge that the way of 
law is ruin. And it is in the context of this decision, with which the present 
generation of lawyers, individually and corporately, is burdened, that a right 
understanding of legal ethics and morality is so fundamental.
Rhode offers us wisdom here too. “The problems facing lawyers,” she claims, 
“involve ... personal identity.”44 This is so because the goodness which our law 
requires of them prevents lawyers from being mere “players of roles.”45 They must 
instead be “actors who merge with their parts”: they must "regard the normative 
structure of society as home."46 For lawyers, our law's very public political morality 
must be personal. It must inform the whole of their lives and form the core of their 
selves, their sense of self, their identity. Lawyers, to repeat, must be lawyers to their 
very roots. On this, and on nothing else, does the goodness of law and the authority 
of the profession depend.
There are no solomonic solutions to living a life of law. Lawyers rather are 
condemned to the insecurity of forming themselves, their identities as lawyers and, 
therefore, as persons, through their day-to-day practices over the wealth of their time 
at the law. Knowing that “by engaging in the activity of law one makes oneself into 
a certain kind of person” does not relieve this anxiety, though for good lawyers it
411 take this wonderful phrase from Mechem. See: P. Mechem, 'The Jurisprudence of Despair" (1936- 
37) 21 Iowa L. Rev. 669.
42 Supra note 34 at 99.
43 S.M. Linowitz, "Moment of Truth for the Legal Profession" [1997] Wisconsin L. Rev. 1211.
44 Supra note 39 at 325.
45R. Dahrendorf, Law and Order (Boulder, CO: Westview P., 1985) at 152.
"Ibid. (emphasis added).
provides the solace of direction.47
Whether this generation of lawyers will find itself in the law, whether lawyers 
will prove themselves right and good for the goodness of their office, remains of 
course to be seen. But the evidence of their success or failure in this is certain: 
professionalism will be redeemed to the extent that the experiences of shame and 
guilt once more become an ethical and moral possibility among lawyers.
47 Glendon, supra note 1 at 240.
